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Critical 9.8Published Aug 10, 2026

CVE-2026-68160ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()

Updated under an hour ago ()

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It affects Linux. Add what you run to find out whether that includes you.

No exploitation reported and no EPSS estimate yet.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.

CVSS
9.8 CRITICAL (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness (CWE)
Not given
Known exploited
Not in CISA's KEV catalog
EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
Not loaded for this CVE
Assigned by
Linux
NVD analysis
Received
Record last updated
Oct 16, 2026
First seen by InfoSec Signals
Oct 9, 2026

Affected products

Affected products
Linux Linux
linux:linux (from the name)
from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea before f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea before 0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea before cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea before 9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea before 03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea before a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea before 71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea before 4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02
CNA record

References

The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

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