CVE-2026-41417Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`.
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Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.
- CVSS
- 5.3 MEDIUM (v3.1, NVD)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-93, CWE-444
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- Not given
- NVD analysis
- Analyzed
- Record last updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 9, 2026
Affected products
netty netty netty:netty | before 4.1.133; from 4.2.0 before 4.2.13 | NVD |
References
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-v8h7-rr48-vmmvexploit, mitigation, vendor-advisory
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.