CVE-2026-19947Missing kernel object permission check in devmux syscalls allows unprivileged user threads to retarget a device multiplexer
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No exploitation reported and no EPSS estimate yet.
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The device multiplexer pseudo-driver in drivers/misc/devmux/devmux.c exposes two system calls, devmux_select_get() and devmux_select_set(). When CONFIG_USERSPACE is enabled, their user-mode verifiers z_vrfy_devmux_select_get() and z_vrfy_devmux_select_set() forwarded directly to the kernel implementations without performing any kernel-object validation — no k_object_access_check() and no driver object check. Compounding this, DEVICE_DT_INST_DEFINE() registered devmux instances with a NULL driver API pointer, which causes scripts/build/gen_kobject_list.py to skip them entirely, so a devmux device had no struct k_object and no permission on it could be granted or withheld in the first place. Any thread running in user mode can reach the defect: device pointers such as DEVICE_DT_GET(DT_NODELABEL(devmux0)) are compile-time constants available to application code, and the syscall accepted them from a thread that had never been granted access to the device. The kernel implementations do validate the pointer against the static devmux instance table and bounds-check the selection index, so this is not a memory-safety issue; the failure is purely one of authorization. Exposure requires CONFIG_USERSPACE=y together with the experimental CONFIG_DEVMUX=y (which depends on CONFIG_DEVICE_MUTABLE) and a zephyr,devmux devicetree node. An unprivileged user-mode thread can read and change which downstream device a multiplexer forwards to, bypassing the userspace object-permission model. Because a devmux forwards the data, configuration and API of the selected device — its documented use being zephyr,console and zephyr,shell-uart switching — an attacker can suppress console, log and shell output, redirect that output to a downstream device it is able to observe, or flip the selection underneath another thread that is legitimately using the multiplexer. The impact is bounded to the devicetree-fixed set of downstream devices; no out-of-bounds access or arbitrary pointer dereference is reachable. The fix declares __subsystem struct devmux_driver_api and attaches a DEVICE_API(devmux, devmux_api) instance to each devmux device so that it becomes a tracked K_OBJ_DRIVER_DEVMUX kernel object, and adds K_OOPS(devmux_inst_get(dev) == SIZE_MAX) plus K_OOPS(k_object_access_check(dev) != 0) to both verifiers.
- CVSS
- 5.3 MEDIUM (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-862
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- zephyr
- NVD analysis
- Received
- Record last updated
- Oct 21, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 21, 2026
Affected products
zephyrproject zephyr zephyrproject:zephyr (from the name) | from 3.6.0 before 4.5.0 | CNA record |
References
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4b7f98345d8f894f4b8aabe52a2623d843669facpatch
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-8m8g-f5jf-x28x
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.